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THE ASSAULT THAT FAILED:
THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF
LAISSEZ FAIRE

Richard A. Epstein*
THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND EcoNOMics MOVEMENT. By Barbara H.

Fried. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp.
$55.
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PLAYING FOR ALL THE MARBLES

Robert Lee Hale has long been an intellectual thorn in the side
of the defenders of laissez faire, among whom I am quite happy to
count myself. As Barbara Fried1 notes in her meticulous study of
Hale's work, his name is hardly a household word. But both di
rectly and indirectly, his influence continues to be great. His best
known work is perhaps Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 2 published in 1923 as a review of Thomas
Nixon Carver's Principles of National Economy, 3 itself a defense of
the classical principles of laissez faire, remembered today only for
the drubbing that it took at Hale's hands. Hale also wrote one of
the early influential treatments of the problem of "unconstitutional
conditions," which addressed the still-perplexing question of the
implicit coercion in the government's power to attach unpalatable
conditions to its own contracts or grants.4 He wrote a number of
influential attacks on the principle of freedom of contract.5 He
took an active role (pp. 186-89) in overthrowing the dominance of
Smyth v. Ames, 6 which for the better part of two generations fixed
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
A.B. 1964, Columbia; B.A. 1966, Oxford; LLB. 1968, Yale. - Ed. I should like to thank
Laura Clinton, Jonathan Mitchell, Camille Orme, and Edward Siskel for their helpful
research assistance on this paper.
1. Professor of Law and Deane Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School.
2. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
Por.. Ser. Q. 470 (1923).
3. THOMAS NIXON CARVER, PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL ECONOMY (1921).
4. See Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUM.
L. REv. 321 {1935).
5. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L.
REv. 603 {1943). The same issue of the Columbia Law Review contained Friedrich Kessler's
famous, if misguided, attack on standard form contracts. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
. 6. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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the "fair value" limitation as a restraint on the state power to regu
late railroads and other public utilities. Although his work is not as
well known in general intellectual circles today as that of T.H.
Green7 or Leonard Hobhouse,8 (who both receive much attention
from Fried), Hale has a low-key durability that ranks him as one of
the most formidable and persistent foes of laissez faire in the first
half of this century.To be sure, a steady stream of distinguished authors has taken
note of his positions and has sought, generally, to build upon them.9
But Fried is the first writer to devote a long-overdue, full-length
monograph to his work. Hers is, without question, a careful and
sympathetic portrait of Hale. Her mission is to persuade the reader
that his insights are lasting and his continued influence fully de
served. Fried has had access to Hale's private papers and is thor
oughly conversant in nineteenth century intellectual forces in both
Great Britain and the United States. At every point she gives due
credit to the many earlier writers who helped to shape Hale's views.
Indeed, her copious footnotes are a treasure trove of information
for anyone who wants to study further the intellectual origins of the
progressive tradition. 10
Not surprisingly, Fried also identifies strongly with Hale's sub
stantive positions. Most concretely, she claims that his conceptual
framework "allowed him to make three crucial and largely irrefuta
ble points" (p. 18). These are, first, that coercion, properly under
stood, is "ubiquitous, inevitable, and, to a considerable extent,
desirable"; second, that coercion is measured by its target and not
by its source, so that individuals can be coerced either by natural
necessities or by legal rules; and third (in consequence of the first
two), that the Supreme Court could not rely on any constitutional
theory that sought to "condemn state interference with private
choices merely on the ground that it was factually coercive" (p. 18).
In the end, however, Fried cannot rehabilitate ideas that, however
alluring, were unsound the day they were penned and have proved
7. See, e.g., T.H. Green, Lecture, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract (1881), in
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF T.H. GREEN 43-74 (John Rodman ed., 1964).
8. See, e.g., L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM {1911), reprinted in LIBERALISM AND OTHER
WRITINGS (James Meadowcroft ed., 1994) at 1.
9. Fried lists the recent contributions at p. 217, n.2. They include: Neil Duxbury, Robert
Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 Moo. L. REv. 421 (1990); Pavlos Eleftheriadis,
Unfreedom in a Laissez-Faire State, 80 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. L. & Soc. PHIL. 168 (1994); and
Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING ETc. 83
{1993). The titles indicate the widespread support for Hale's position, which has also been
invoked by such distinguished scholars as Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, Frank
Michelman, Gary Peller, and Cass Sunstein.
10. But with this caveat: with such voluminous notes, the references should be more
explicitly cross-referenced to the first citation of a given work, and a full biography should be
included at the back to give greater access.
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ever more untenable with the passage of time. The bottom line is
this: Hale was an ingenious scholar, but a systematic failure.
To defend this harsh conclusion, it is necessary to recap in brief
form the main principles of laissez faire theory, with its economic,
institutional, and constitutional dimensions. Its central tenets at
tach great importance to individual liberty, private property, free
dom of contract, and limited government. In its negative frame of
mind, laissez faire takes a dim view of the use of force and fraud in
human relations, and (in its sensible versions at least) worries about
the dangers that flow from the use of monopoly power, whether
acquired by legal grant or by hard labor mixed with good fortune.
This last qualification is important, for, as Fried notes, the
American version of the theory allowed a good deal more leeway to
government than some of its Spencerian forbearers. More specifi
cally, American laissez faire allowed government intervention to
create infrastructure and other public goods. It also found the con
trol of monopolies to be a legitimate government function, not only
when these were created by operation of law, but also when they
arose solely by private means.11 ,
By the same token, laissez faire also takes a cautious view of
government power. Laissez faire is not a disguised form of anarch
ism, and it recognizes the need for state power to preserve public
safety, health, and good order. It understands that the government
must supply public infrastructure, and, in line with the Fifth
Amendment, recognizes that the state may properly take private
property for public use so long as it pays just compensation for it.
Laissez faire constitutionalism had its strong defenders in the nine
teenth century, among whom Thomas Cooley12 and Christopher
Tiedeman13 figure prominently.
Writing at the height of the progressive movement in American
politics, Hale would have none of this. His major negative mission
was to rip down the institutional and constitutional infrastructure
upon which laissez faire rested. He thought that vast levels of legis
lative discretion over the regulation of economic affairs were
proper. Toward that end, he believed that the major function of
government was to improve the economic position of the working
class. This single desire made him a staunch early defender of the
Wagner Act, and a defender of various systems of wage and price
controls that could prevent the rentiers who owned private prop11. P. 30. For a similar account, see Jacob Vmer, The Intellectual History ofLaissez Faire,
3 J.L & ECON. 45, 45 (1960).
12. See THOMAS M. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON nm CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
(1868).
13. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON nm LIMITATIONS OF PoucE
POWER IN nm UNITED STATES (1886). Fried leads with Tiedeman in her introduction. See p.
1.
.
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erty from reaping "supernormal returns" (p. 6), that is, any gains
from the use of the property that were not necessary to prevent that
property from being turned to another use.
Yet for all his obsessions, Hale curiously failed to defend his
positive mission. Even though his political positions were relatively
clear, he never quite tells us what the legislature should do with its
power, or why it should do it, once it extricated itself from the false
gods of classical constitutional law and laissez faire economics.
Hale was much more comfortable whipping his enemies than devel
oping his own positive vision. Indeed, given his methods, that is
just what should be expected. Hale worked by intellectual demoli
tion. The titles of Fried's key chapters capture his intensity. Her
neutrally labeled "Introduction" is followed by heavy artillery.
Chapter Two is devoted to "The Empty Idea of Liberty." Hard on
its heels comes Chapter Three, "The Empty Idea of Property
Rights." The term "empty" is meant to convey the strong philo
sophical condemnation of these bellwether conceptions of laissez
faire. Hale was not content to show how liberty and property had
lost their practical punch in the modem industrial age. Rather,
emptiness stands for the intellectual bankruptcy on which it is im
possible to build a coherent system of legal rights and duties, no
matter what the social context. According to Hale, laissez faire
could do no better by simple rustic societies than complex industrial
economies.
But if these terms are incoherent, what philosophical vocabulary
could do better? It seems equally likely that some astute critic will
find some fatal contradiction in "human equality," "public inter
est," or "common good." Surely any determined critic could have a
field day with "gender equality," or with "equalizing people's func
tional capacity to achieve a meaningful life,"14 or the countless egal
itarian variations on these themes. The battle over political and
legal theory will not be won by any deductive assault that proclaims
the logical necessity of its own position and the conceptual incoher
ence of all rival camps - a lesson that applies to libertarian theo
rists as well as to champions of the welfare state.15 The great
danger of throwing knockout punches is that they often backfire to
cold-cock those who throw them.
Alas, Hale never quite understood the force of that observation.
His great weakness was his determination to slay the dragon '\vith
out pausing to consider what he would put in its place. The more
14. P. 206 (citing AMARTYA SEN, lNEouALITY REEXAMINED (1992), and Martha Nuss
baum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GooD 203 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990)).
15. See RANDY E. BARNETI, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998), which I criticize on
these grounds in Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian Quartet, REASON, Jan. 1999, at 61.
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sensible theoretical position starts from the premise that any legal
order necessarily depends on second-best accommodations that are
needed precisely because first-best solutions are never obtainable.
Pure conceptual arguments are necessarily limited in their scope
and power. They can remove ambiguity; they can eliminate contra
diction. But, in the end, these preliminaries only serve to beef up
the rival theories - libertarianism, socialism, progressivism, liber
alism, egalitarianism, totalitarianism - which have to stand or fall
on some rough empirical estimation of their relative strengths and
weaknesses. Because he never quite grasped this point, Hale was
too confident in his negative case against traditional laissez faire,
and too sketchy in his own affirmative case. As Fried lamely con
cludes, "while Hale's argument was analytically radical, it did not
lead necessarily to politically radical conclusions" (p. 210). Hale
was too knowledgeable about the merits of competition as a social
ist, and too concerned with incentives to be an unstinting egalita
rian. Fried is right to say that he is best understood to be part of the
tradition of Hobhouse, Dewey, Lippmann, and other social demo
crats who sought to find "a middle way between the new socialism
and the old liberalism" (p. 233 n.35).
Nevertheless, the team of Hale and Fried has been touted as
having made "one of the best demolitions, in law or political theory,
of that contested concept [of laissez faire]."16 But Hale accom
plishes nothing this grand, as Fried herself reluctantly recognizes.
To be sure, throughout the early parts of the book, Fried praises
Hale's analytical power. But in her more guarded and textured
Conclusion, she offers a much more candid assessment of the "more
solid, functionalist footing" that he sought to create.
Nothing logically followed from that change in Hale's view, beyond
the all-important conclusion for Hale's contemporaries that most
legal questions were questions of policy for the legislature, not mat
ters of constitutional rights for the courts. How legislatures ought to
resolve them was, of course, another matter, and one on which Hale's
skeptical, deconstructive analysis offered little guidance. This omis
sion will no doubt strike many modem readers of Hale's work as its
most serious limitation. [p. 210]

Right on! In reality, the situation is much worse than this. The
cupboard empty of constructive proposals for reform should lead us
to doubt Hale's negative program. Ingenious and provocative it
may be - but wrong, and ultimately wrong-headed as well. To de
fend this assessment, it is useful to analyze his ideas in exactly the
order that Fried discusses them. The first section of this review ana
lyzes Hale's critiques of liberty and property. The second examines
his position on the progressive obsession with the unearned incre16. As asserted on the jacket cover by my colleague Cass Sunstein.
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ment of private property. The third deals with Hale's views on rate
regulation. He is wrong about all three.
THE "EMPTY" IDEA OF LIBERTY
As noted above, the fundamental distinction for a laissez faire
system is that between coercive exactions and voluntary transac
tions. The key element of the voluntary transaction is that it only
takes place when it produces benefits to both participants. It there
fore results in a positive sum game for its players, which presump
tively means that it should be enforced unless it imposes some
larger offsetting disability on third parties. It is this simple insight
that led, for example, to the constitutional protection of freedom of
contract in Coppage v. Kansas. 11
On the other side of the line are those transactions whose volun
tariness is vitiated by force or fraud. In these cases, the assumption
of mutual gain no longer holds. People will yield property if faced
with the threat (or left with the choice) of their money or their life;
people will make silly trades if made to believe that the property or
service they receive is worth more than it really is. The system of
private contract law seeks primarily to use public force to enforce
positive sum games while withholding enforcement from negative
sum games. Contracts are likely to be negative sum games when
their background conditions are such as to make one party a sys
tematic ex ante loser. To identify such cases requires that one be
able to distinguish between coercive and noncoercive transactions.
Hale's major thrust is to undermine this program by asserting
that the term "coercion" has no intelligible meaning. To Hale, co
ercion in the private arena was not limited to the use or threat of
physical force by one person against another. Nor was it so limited
in the public sphere in connection with state action directed against
private persons. Rather, as Fried notes, coercion covered much
more ground for Hale - indeed it covered just about all the
ground. Thus Hale claimed that coercion "took the form of back
ground constraints on the universe of socially available choices
from which an individual could 'freely' choose." 18 Armed with this
broad definition of coercion, Hale directed his fire to the "so-called
voluntary market exchanges, in which each side coerced the other
to relinquish its property or services by a (legally sanctioned) threat
17. 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
"Indeed a little reflection will show that wherever the right of private property and the
right of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or less
influenced by the question whether he has much property, or little, or none; for the
contract is made to the very end that each may gain something that he needs or desires
more urgently than that which he proposes to give in exchange."
236 U.S. at 17.
18. P. 17; see also p. 36.
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to withhold its own property or services if the demanded terms
were not obtained in exchange" (p. 17).
The obvious targets of this position were the classical laissez
faire theorists such as Herbert Spencer and Carver who champi
oned "the dogma of noninterference" in contractual relationships
(pp. 29-30). In a constitutional framework, Hale's critique meant
that the Supreme Court could no longer defer to private choices on
the grounds that these choices were noncoercive, while public
choices were always coercive. That critique brought into the
crosshairs of progressive jurisprudence Lochner v. New York, 19
which struck down a ten-hour workday for certain types of bakers
in New York; Adair v. United States20 and Coppage v. Kansas,21
which struck down statutes that made it illegal for employers to in
sist on yellow-dog contracts, in which working for the firm was
made explicitly conditional on not j oining a union; and Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,22 which held that the tort of induce
ment of breach of contract could be used directly against a union
that encouraged workers to join it secretly in breach of their con
tractual undertaking. All of these decisions are quite sound if the
traditional account of coercion is correct - a concession that Hale
never explicitly made. But they are clearly suspect if Hale's insis
tence on broader background conditions carries the day.
How does Hale make his claim work? In his famous attack on
Carver's Principles of National Economy, Hale argues that the re
fusal to accept any terms proffered is always coercive, regardless of
the dominant market structure. But there is nothing to back up this
claim. Hale gives the instance of a prospective employer who co
erces a prospective employee by demanding that the latter work at
a lower wage.23 But since his account of coercion is not role-spe
cific, he has to acknowledge that the employee coerces the em
ployer when the employee asks for higher wages.24 Indeed,
coercion is not confined to employment relations but covers all so
called voluntary transactions. So any trade between merchants, any
marriage, any joint venture, or any supermarket purchase is also
tainted by coercion, even if the mutual gain assumption holds for
the contracting parties. The thought that prices and wages commu
nicate something about the opportunity costs of goods and labor, so
that individuals and firms will have some sense of the scarcity value
19. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
21. 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
22. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
23. See Hale, supra note 2, at 472-73.
24. See id. at 474 ("In paying high wages to wage-earners . . . he is [influenced by their
will]. But for their will to obtain the high wages, and their power of backing up that will, he
has no reason for paying them. Yet he does. What else is 'coercion'?").
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of human and material resources, nowhere enters into Hale's analy
sis. Hale also never addresses the insights of F.A. Hayek25 on the
point, even though Hale remained an active scholar through the
1940s when the socialist calculation debate had more or less run its
course. The possibility that competitive markets constrain the de
gree of coercion by allowing for new entry is likewise a point that
Hale never examines.
The irony here is palpable. Hale complains that the traditional
definitions are muddled and confused (p. 206). But he never con
fronts the obvious objection that his own definition of coercion is so
broad that it sweeps every form of human conduct within it. In the
end, Hale tells us nothing at all, for, as Fried acknowledges in the
end, refusals to deal in competitive markets must at some level be
distinguished from the gun-to-the-head scenarios to which Hale
analogizes such refusal.26
,
The evident vice of Hale's analysis is to make coercion into a
useless construct that purports to cover an infinite array of cases.
Yet if Hale were right, just what should be done once it is no longer
possible to expunge coercion from human affairs? If the older
laissez faire system does not work, what should replace it? How do
we decide which forms of social coercion are permissible and which
are not? On this score, Hale says nothing that would lead anyone
to conclude that the traditional uses of force are mysteriously non
coercive. His analysis would persuade no one to legalize murder
and robbery. So his real task is to identify what other forms of
ostensible market behavior should be regarded as coercive as well.
One obvious candidate, just noted, for special treatment is the
behavior of monopolies, which (as will be discussed presently) was
already done under the prevailing intellectual and constitutional
doctrines that Hale attacked. But for Hale, and for so many
progressives, their loose talk about coercion runs the system into
reverse. Competition is called coercion; and the creation of a state
monopoly for labor is defended in the name of liberty of contract.
Of course, this works in favor of those union members whom Hale
championed. But what is so striking about his position is its antiso
cial component, for he never asks who is hurt by the new rights he
creates. Employers don't seem to have a utility worth preserving,
even if they have devoted their entire lives to their businesses. Ri
val workers who are excluded by union organizations just don't
count. And consumers, many of whom work in other industries,
25. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REv. 519 (1945).
Fried makes only one passing reference to Hayek's work, p. 35, even though Hayek is in
some sense the antithesis of Hale.
26. "There remains a difference, after all, between pointing a gun at another's head and
demanding 'Your money or your life,' and threatening to withhold bread from a starving
person unless she consents to pay the market price." Pp. 211-12.
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don't count either. Instead, what Hale does is endorse a system in
which competitive labor markets are transformed by law into mo
nopolistic ones. In some cases, collective bargaining leads only to
marathon negotiations that end in an agreement. In other cases,
the government-created structures lead to strikes that disrupt indus
trial production, or worse, shut down various service industries,
causing massive inconvenience measured at a global level. Yet
Hale does not offer us a single word that might allow us to under
stand, thinking only in contemporary terms, why the shutting down
of Major League Baseball in 1994 or the NBA strike of 1998 should
count as a good thing; or why airline strikes should be allowed to
cripple entire segments of the nation so that airline pilots and
mechanics can continue to earn monopoly rents. In the end, Hale's
talk about the widespread and inevitable use of coercion removes
from the table the one intellectual construct that could allow for a
coherent social policy on these issues. In its stead we get a narrow
minded boosterism of one side in an industrial struggle, without any
appreciation of the dislocations that his cheerleading causes.
Hale was right about one thing, however. The constitutional
orientation contained in Lochner, Adair, and Coppage does depend
on the soundness of the laissez faire definition of coercion that un
derlies it. But he, like Fried, shrinks away from the key conse
quence of that position. Should Hale be wrong on the definition of
coercion, the progressive critique of these classical constitutional
decisions breaks into pieces. Lochner is not a case which allows
employers to exploit their workers. Rather, it becomes a case
where the small immigrant baker firms are allowed to operate in
competition with the larger domestic firms that seek to put them
out of business by disguising blatantly anticompetitive measures as
health statutes. Even Hale should have taken pause that Lochner
was not sued by his workers. He was prosecuted by a state eager to
"protect" workers out of their jobs. Rightly understood, Adair and
Coppage are easier cases to defend on their merits because the state
interference (by force of course) with freedom of contract does not
even have the fig leaf of health or safety to justify it. Rather, both
cases struck down legislation that wanted to displace a competitive
labor market with a monopolistic one in exchange for purported
social gains that have yet to be identified.
If these decisions are correct, then so too is Hitchman Coal, for,
as Fried herself acknowledges (p. 231 n.26), unless the action for
inducement of breach of contract is allowed, then the hapless em
ployer is left with the task of having to sue or dismiss all of his
employees individually, assuming that he can show that they have
covertly joined the union. An injunction against the third party,
however, stops the organizing activity in its tracks. That much, the
progressives of all generations are prepared to concede. But what
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is their justification for knocking out the inducement tort in these
cases? Surely it cannot rest on the view that the employer has en
gaged in state action when he calls on the state to enforce its con
tract and the property laws. Hale claimed that employers received
a form of "delegated" power from the state (p. 65), which carries
with it the ominous conclusion that anyone who wants to keep
other people from meddling with his or her body or land can only
do so if the state decides to delegate that right to exclude. The only
way to defeat the traditional view of natural rights seems to be
worse than the disease. It is to assume that in a constitutional gov
ernment, the state, through its power of definition, has absolute
control over the liberties and fortunes of its citizens. What other
conclusion could we reach by starting from the premise that liberty
and property are empty concepts until state action infuses them
with some measurable content?
Moving on, once Adair and Coppage are accepted as correct,
Hale's attack on the yellow-dog contract must fail as well. If labor
contracts are as good as any others, then Hale must explain why
inducement of breach of contract is an inappropriate cause of ac
tion in this context while valid in all others. The ill-fated English
Trade Disputes Act of 190627 singled out inducement of breach of
contract in labor disputes for special treatment. By removing the
operation of the common law in this area alone, the Act led to the
steady deterioration of labor relations in Great Britain, which
helped assure its long-term decline as a world power.28 A similar
hostility to the tort was reached later in the United States under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act29 and finally under the Wagner Act,30 which
Hale so strongly defends.31 Once again, these statutes should be
27. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47.
act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be
actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of
employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some
other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his
labour as he wills.
Id. § 3. The last clause, of course, was designed to attack the conception of individual self
ownership of labor that is central to the traditional common law view of capital and labor
markets.
28. For some measure of the decline, see PAUL KENNEDY, THE RisE AND FALL OF THE
GREAT POWERS 228 (1987) ("[British i]ndustrial production, which had grown at an annual
rule of about 4 percent in the period 1820 to 1840 and about 3 percent between 1840 and
1870, became more sluggish; between 1875 and 1894 it grew at just over 1.5 percent annu
ally. . . . ). The relative British decline between 1880 and 1914 was quite conspicuous, and its
start coincided with the passage of the Employer Liability Act of 1880, 43 & 44 Viet., ch. 42.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994). Section 103 denies injunctive relief for inducement of
breach.
30. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
31. P. 6. The differences between the English and American positions are important,
because the English courts and administration left labor contracts unenforceable, while the
An

"
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deplored for their ability to create legal monopolies out of competi
tive industries. But Hale staunchly defends them, without making
any analysis of their global consequences. And what does the Wag
ner Act prohibit? Section 8(1) makes it an unfair labor practice "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their
rights to bargain collectively]."32 How could Hale support this act
when it contains the terms "coercion, interference and restraint,"
which he had found to be intellectually vacuous in his own aca
demic writings? It's amazing how conceptual clarity comes to those
who enjoy political power! Ironically, here it really does suffer
from that charge because the context of the statute makes it clear
that coercion has to go beyond common law threats or use of force
in order for the Wagner Act to effectuate what was doubtless in
tended - a major shift in the labor law. To this day, the law contin
ues to struggle with these anomalies, and for what purpose?
There is another real cost to the conceptual blunderbuss that
Hale wields. It makes it impossible for him to level more restrictive
criticisms against positions that he disagrees with. As Fried re
counts, Thomas Nixon Carver was anything but a consistent and
thoroughgoing defender of laissez faire (p. 45). Carver's Principles
contains some suggestions for a program to eliminate poverty that
seeks to raise the wage levels of the lower classes by government
controls on income distribution, restrictions on immigration, lower
ing birth rates, subsidizing vocational education, and the like (pp.
45-46). Many of these proposals are costly or counterproductive, or
both; certainly the restriction on immigration was one of the most
hotly debated topics of his time, as it is in ours. As Fried notes,
Carver thought that "one must always ask, 'Are the results of re
pression or regulation worth as much as they cost?' - cost, that is,
in individual liberty" (p. 45). What she fails to point out is that
Carver asked the right question to which he may have given the
wrong answer. In contrast, Hale asked the wrong question when he
sought to defeat the classical view of laissez faire on linguistic
grounds. In so doing, he forfeited the opportunity to identify some
specific adverse consequences of Carver's program that should have
led to the rejection of some of its key components.
This error is one that came back to haunt the defenders of the
Progressive Era (whose leader, Woodrow Wilson, segregated the
United States Civil Service shortly after he came into office). As
Fried rightly notes, it hardly helps the defenders of free speech to
note that the idea of liberty is empty and that coercion always lies
in the eye of the beholder (p. 208). It surely embarrasses a civil
American system, in its search for the middle way, subjected first employers, and then un
ions, to comprehensive systems of direct regulation.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1994).
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rights movement to say that the state could, in the exercise of its
discretion, justify segregated schools and antimiscegenation laws as
a means to preserve racial purity (p. 208). But that is the price paid
in condemning as incoherent the building blocks of any intelligible
legal system. It is an especially high price to pay when the sophisti
cated critique is wrong and the traditional defender of laissez faire
is, on this point at least, correct.
·

THE "EMPTY" !DEA OF PROPERTY
Hale does no better in his conceptual crusade against the empty
idea of property. On this score, however, his attack takes a some
what different though equally unpersuasive direction. When Hale
wrote, the Civil War was of more recent memory, so that no one
would argue that individual autonomy is "the creature of the state,"
which should be allowed only when used to advance the public in
terest. Even today the totalitarian implications of this position for
such matters are too chilling to give it much appeal. But on matters
of private property, Hale joined with a large band of socialists and
progressives who found great comfort in stating that property was
the creature of the state which could be used by private individuals
only to the extent that it advances the common good. That position
starts in a quite different place from the usual Lockean notions,
which hold that taking first possession of an unowned thing
removes it from the commons and reduces it to private ownership.
The socialists and progressives all insisted to some degree on a top
down system of property rights. But by the same token, the
progressives (far more than the socialists) realized that many of the
traditional incidents of private property had to be preserved "to
foster moral self-development or productivity" (p. 72).
Reduced to a phrase, natural law justifications for private prop
erty were obviously out, but instrumental justifications were, grudg
ingly, in. Once more the point was strictly a matter of political
judgment and convenience. The state which created private prop
erty could destroy private property when it no longer served the
social ends for which it was designed. The implications for
American Constitutionalism were clear. The protections afforded
under the Contracts, Takings or Due Process Clauses were at best
anomalous, and could not be invoked to resist any widespread sys
tem of social regulation done in the name of the common good. For
these purposes, the common good included not only schemes that
improved the lot of all individuals relative to some private property
alternative, but also those schemes that served appropriate distribu
tional ends, including assuring that all individuals have some mini
mum level of self-sufficiency. The basic drift of the position favored
income redistribution so long as it did not trench too sharply into
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the private incentives for production. The thought that various
forms of common property, as with fl.owing water, could actually be
more efficient than private property from a productive point of
view did not register with Hale and his intellectual cohorts, depriv
ing them of the strongest demonstration of the principled limita
tions on any well-functioning system of private property.33
In responding to Hale and the progressives, it is, I think, impor
tant to recognize that one portion of their critique does make some
sense. It is hard to defend the classical rules of property by some
vacant appeal to natural law, as if the allure of the institution could
only be denied on pain of self-contradiction. But the point is hardly
dispositive of the overall exercise, for it only pushes back the in
quiry to find the utilitarian basis on which any system of property
has to rest and to which Hale himself was drawn (p. 73). Hale's
combative nature leads him astray because he never asks the simple
question of whether any genuine social advantages attach to the
Lockean rule that awards property to its first possessor.
Yet these advantages are easy to identify. The first possession
rule is relatively easy to apply. It guides potential disputants and
allows them to take sensible steps to establish their claims by mark
ing with fences or recordation. The rule also reduces uncertainty
over ownership and allows property to be put quickly to productive
use, or to be stockpiled until needed at some later time - a point
of no little concern in the face of increased demands to preserve a
pristine environment. The first possession rule also facilitates a co
herent system of exchange. Because of these advantages, the prin
ciple "prior in time is higher in right" has earned its place in both
common law and civil law systems.34
By the same token, it would be foolish for any defender of
laissez faire to follow the Lockean insistence that an ideal legal sys
tem has private ownership over all resources. Most obviously, the
common law never took that view and had regimes of common
property for water and for beaches. It also used state powers of
eminent domain to condemn land for the construction of highways.
Nor was it unsympathetic to the qualification and rejection of the
first possession rule when it led to the premature destruction of nat
ural resources, as with the well-rehearsed example of the fishery.
The obvious point is that all individuals within the group can be
made better off if consumption is deferred so that the stock can
continue to produce sustainable yields over the long run. Some nat33. For my recent elaboration of this theme, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A
FREE SOCIETY: REcoNCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE CoMMON Gooo chs. 9 (Com
mon Property) & 10 (Common Carriers) (1998).
34. For a fuller discussion, see RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WoRLD 50-93 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv.
1221 (1979).
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ural-rights diehards might dispute these conclusions, but most de
fenders of laissez faire are not troubled in principle with these
forms of state intervention.35 Rather, their affection for the rule of
first possession creates a presumption which can be displaced only
when its critics show its failings, relative to a system of regulation,
in any particular case. It is not that the idea of private property is
empty. It is that private property regimes have genuine shortfalls
that in some circumstances can be countered by intelligent state ac
tion. It is for this reason, and none more profound, that we have a
different attitude to the limitation on individual liberty and auton
omy. The competition in labor markets does not lead to the same
social dislocations as overfishing or overhunting.
If Hale and the progressives had contented themselves with this
critique, then little would separate them from the intelligent de
fenders of laissez faire. But Hale is not content with these half
measures. Instead he once again goes for the knockout blow. His
first point is that the common law rule of first possession is neces
sarily flawed because it gives the first possessor the benefit of the
unearned rent. Indeed the principle is far broader. As Fried sum
marizes, "individuals are entitled to a portion of their social prod
uct, equal to a fair return on cost or sacrifice; but the surplus above
that is rightly society's, to do with as it sees fit" (p. 213). Thus those
individuals who own, for example, superior land that requires little
cultivation should be able to retain from the price of goods sold an
amount sufficient to cover their labor. But the unearned increment
from the superior land should be turned over to the state.
Fried is drawn to Hale's view on this point because it shows the
"soft underbelly of libertarian Lockeanism" (p. 213). She
continues:
The difficulty of justifying a right to surplus value continues to plague
many contemporary libertarian theories. Robert Nozick's principle of
"justice in transfer," for example, elaborated in Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, assumes (and in tum purports to shore up) a private right to
whatever exchange price the market will bear. But as Nozick himself
concedes, that principle is not always easy to defend. It is also incon
sistent with Nozick's own treatment of surplus value or rents else
where in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. So also, much of Richard
Epstein's Takings, the best-known recent attempt to translate liberta
rian principles to a legal regime, rests on the (undefended) assertion
that individuals have a right to appropriate the surplus value created
by society, in proportion to the value of assets that they bring into
society from a hypothetical state of nature. [p. 213; footnote omitted]
35. And it all fits in quite well with the Takings Clause. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAK·
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 216-28 (1985) (chapter 15
dealing with "property and the common pool").
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It is useful to note that, having made these criticisms, Fried
rightly thinks that Hale's effort to extract the unearned surplus
from all market transactions is doomed to failure on simple practi
cal grounds. No one knows how much cost or sacrifice is involved
in any particular transaction, and no one wants to bear the enor
mous administrative costs and invasions of privacy that it would
take to find all this out. The simpler approach to this problem is to
tax the gain on each transaction (the amount received less the cost
basis), and to assume that taxation on those gains serves as a rough
proxy for the amount of benefits that individuals receive from state
intervention.
These remarks help to justify my (undefended) assumption that
individuals should share in social gains in proportion to their contri
butions to public events. But I thought that I gave a rather more
extensive justification for that position in both Takings and Bar
gaining with the State. 36 One part of that defense is that the size of
the social surplus is not independent of the rules used to decide its
division. Let individuals think that the social surplus is always up
for grabs, and they will spend resources to deflect as large a fraction
of that surplus to their own private ends. In the end, thrust and
riposte dissipate any surplus created by state action. The central
function of the Takings Clause is to make sure that the state does
not take on projects with a negative expected value (which is why
compensation has to be paid when property is taken). But the
avoidance of loss is not the same as the maximization of gains. To
meet that last challenge, the central function of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is to stabilize the surplus in connection with
positive sum transactions that should be undertaken.
That observation, standing alone, does not tell us which division
of the surplus is appropriate. Here the theoretical ground for its
proportionate division seeks to make public transactions imitate the
private arrangements that are used to address similar problems.
Thus, when a promoter sells shares of a corporation, the usual
agreement divides the gains in accordance with the amount of
money invested in the business. The whole point here is to equalize
the rate of return across different investments. Any other system of
allocation which promises higher returns to some individuals than it
does to others will result in massive market distortions. Those who
are to receive the low returns will abandon the project in favor of
another that gives them the higher (risk-adjusted) market rate of
return. Once the losers are gone from the project, then the remain
ing investors from Lake Wobegone all hope to receive above
average returns from their investment. Any effort to protect some
36. See EPSTEIN, supra note 35, chs. 1 & 12; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING
7 (Maximizing Social Surplus) (199'3).
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fraction of them with higher rates of return will lead to another
exodus, leaving the same imbalance as before. The equalization of
returns thus sets the stable equilibrium for private investments in
collective goods. It therefore forms a focal point for the creation of
public goods where private consensual arrangements cannot work.
The question of private investment is made more difficult given
the power of shareholders to vote their shares. Should fifty-one
percent of them by vote be able to cancel the shares of the remain
der? Clearly not. No investment can take place under that extreme
assumption. Accordingly, all private transactions combine a system
of voting control with rules that protect shareholder stakes from
expropriation. The majority can decide which ventures the corpo
ration will undertake, but it cannot cut a minority out of its share of
dividends or the proceeds of liquidation. The same risk of confisca
tion exists in the public sector, given the power of the vote. But
here it is not possible to have a system that awards additional votes
to people with larger stakes in the polity, given (at the very least)
the enormous valuation problems in calculating the value of both
human and physical capital. So we engage in a system of one per
son, one vote, and protect property from confiscation by the same
structural protections that corporations and other joint ventures of
fer to induce private investment in the first place. Private property
cannot be taken unless the public pays for it - a protection that is
more important in the political arena than it is in the corporate
arena, given that citizens cannot choose their fellow citizens but
must take them as they are. The dangers of expropriation are at
least as great as they are in private settings. How odd it is to as
sume that no constitutional protections are needed against majority
forms of abuse.
How is this protection implemented when it is often difficult to
measure the individual returns from public order? Individual re
turns from government action are not measured by some simple
balance sheet calculation. Rather, they depend on the full range of
consequences, good and bad, that comes from government action.
In these circumstances, the direct measurement of surplus is usually
not possible, so stabilization of surplus is best achieved by shifting
to indirect measurements of equality. One obvious litmus test of
unequal distribution of the surplus turns on the formal difference in
positions. In one egregious case, white individuals are allowed to
use public facilities to which black individuals are denied access. In
other cases, there are no formal differences in the position of vari
ous individuals, but the disparate impact of the proposal is evident.
Suppose that all individuals are told that they cannot make any fur
ther improvements to their land. If ninety percent of the people
have built homes on their property, and ten percent have vacant
lands, the disparate impact seems evident, and the takings analysis
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yields only one answer: either the winners compensate the losers,
or the regulation is struck down.
In light of this defense, it should be clear that in contrast to the
Nozick of Anarchy, State and Utopia, 37 I am not a hard-core liberta
rian. Rather, I develop systematic rules to indicate when the state
can take private property and what forms of compensation are ap
propriate. Unlike Fried, I refuse to follow in the statist footsteps of
the progressives who claimed that "[i]f anyone had a right to sur
plus value . . . it was not any particular factor [of production], but
rather society at large, to do with as it saw fit to further the com
mon good" (p. 27). Society is not an individual but, like a corpora
tion, it is an elaborate network of contracts that both allows private
transactions and requires all (or some) individuals to contribute
something to the enforcement system that the society operates to
preserve the private rights that it protects. To commit to the state
those resources above and beyond those necessary to run the sys
tem leaves open the question of who should get that unearned sur
plus. Even if no moral case can be made to show that the individual
writer or composer deserves the surplus over the cost of labor from
his compositions, nothing that Fried or anyone else has said shows
that anyone else deserves this surplus, either. It would be a sad day
indeed if we awarded some portion of the surplus to individuals
whose sole contribution to the project is that they refrained from
killing its author or burning his manuscript. The obvious point is
that it is better to put the return in the hands of those who engage
in creative activity rather than the undifferentiated mass that has
done nothing but refrain from throttling him.
It may well be that with intellectual property, the right to ex
clude should not be perpetual given the near-zero costs of repro
duction; the creation of monopoly rights does not come without
social costs. But Hale's argument is not simply the traditional eco
nomic case for limited property rights over the diverse forms of in
tellectual property. It applies with equal force to land and other
factors of production which, unlike intellectual property, cannot be
consumed more than once. In these cases, the real question is to
ask whether we would have a higher level of production if we could
find a way to extract that unearned increment from its producer, or
whether we are better off with the more modest ambition of leaving
the state with the resources it needs to run the machinery of justice
while keeping its hands out of a pot of gold that becomes a ripe
target for political intrigue.
It's not that tough a question to anyone who voices a modicum
of fear of rent-seeking activity. Never give the state a pot of gold,
or even a cookie jar with loose change, that it can distribute
37. See ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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through political means. Indeed, even the limited rights created in
intellectual property meet this test, for it is not as though the state
in its collective capacity takes the copyright or patent after the term
for its private owner has expired, and then charges the monopoly
'price before distributing the proceeds to its favored friends.
Rather, the composition or invention goes into the public domain
where any and all can use it as they see fit. Allowing this property
to fall in perpetuity into the public domain creates a resource base
for all future generations that cannot be frittered away by govern
ment constraint and intrigue. If Hale and Fried have some reason
why this public domain solution is inferior to the perpetuation of
state monopolies, it remains far from apparent. What is clear is
this: whenever the relative benefits and burdens of different de
vices are uncertain, then it is best in the long run to prevent all
individuals, rich or poor, from seeking a disproportionate private
share of the overall surplus. When we cannot calibrate the propor
tionate gain to surplus, it is better to let it lie, unmeasured, where it
falls, than to subject it to the ravages of political machination.

THE REGULATION

OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

The ideas of liberty and property are not empty, but they often
can be defended by a fuller appreciation of the utilitarian argu
ments on their behalf. The same is true of the last target of Hale's
wrath, the "fair value" rule for setting the rates that public utilities
may charge. In this area, we should join in Hale's dissatisfaction
with the naive libertarian approach. Thus libertarians are often un
easy about the creation of any state franchise (read, natural monop
oly) in the first place: where does the state obtain that power to
begin with? But throughout both English and American history,
these franchises were issued, sometimes for good purposes and
sometimes for bad.38 The construction of bridges over public rivers
could not take place unless the state allowed private individuals to
build on common property. But no individual would make private
investments over public waters if the state could launch a competi
tor nearby once its project was completed. Here, moreover, the
original investor is not some firm displaced by a more efficient com
petitor. As Hale himself would have recognized, the second com
petitor could come in with a handsome government subsidy that
would allow it to undercut the first entrant, even if its newer opera
tion were less efficient. If only one bridge were necessary for all the

38. For a balanced and informative account of the early franchises, see HERBERT
HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw: 1836-1937 (1991).
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traffic going over a key river, then who would want to bear the cost
of constructing two?39
Fortunately, the common law take on this subject was more
nuanced than some idealized libertarian position. Here the key
question was: What kinds of constraints should the state impose on
any firm to which it granted some form of public monopoly? The
answer, generally speaking, was that the firm in question was only
entitled to a reasonable rate of return on its investment, and that it
could not discriminate among the various customers for whom it
supplied the only means of service or transportation. All of this
was clearly established as early as the late seventeenth century,
when Matthew Hale (no relation to Robert) noted that industries
affected with the public interest were subject to state rate regula
tion to prevent the abuse of monoply. Matthew Hale's discussion is
short and worth quoting in full:

A man for his own private advantage may in a port town set up a
wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers may
agree for cranage, wharfage, &c; for he doth no more than is lawful
for any man to do, viz. make the most of his own," &c.
"If the King
or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to
that port must come and unlade or lade their goods, as for the pur
pose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the Queen, accord
ing to the st. 1 Eliz. c. 11, or because there is no other wharf in that
port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there
cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage,
&c., neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the
duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the King's
licence or charter; for now the wharf and crane and other conve
niences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris
privati only. As if a man set out a street in a new building on his own
land, it is now no longer bare private interest but it is affected with a
public interest.40
-

This passage worked its way across the Atlantic into Munn v.
where it posed the questions of what industries were af
fected by the public interest and what could be done about it. On
the first point, Robert Hale and Fried both recognize that various
state monopolies, including common carriers and public utilities,
were covered by the rule. The point of dispute was whether other
industries, on which large segments of the public were dependent,

Illinois, 41

39. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), which dealt
at great length with the question of whether an exclusive franchise should be inferred when
the original grant was silent on that term. The Supreme Court, in its first major decision after
the departure of Chief Justice Marshall, held that the default position was that the grant was
not exclusive.
40. Matthew Hale, de portibus marl (loosely translated: on the gates to the sea), quoted
in Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East 527, 530, 104 Eng. Rep. 206, 208 (K.B. 1810) (emphasis added).
For a longer analysis of this problem, see EPSTEIN, supra note 33, ch. 10.
41. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).

1716

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1697

also counted as being affected with the public interest, even when
their goods and services were competitively supplied. Hale, along
with leading intellectual figures of his generation, such as Walton
Hamilton,42 took the position that the pre-1937 Supreme Court was
doomed to split hairs without purpose for deciding which industries
were properly subject to price regulation. All industries were so
affected that it was solely a matter of public policy that determined
which should be regulated and which not.
There is no doubt that the case law was muddled during much of
the time that Hale wrote, and that the Supreme Court struggled
with the task of classification, veering first in this direction and then
that. But the soundness of the overall system is not measured by
the marginal cases alone. Of equal or greater importance is the
treatment at the extremes. As Fried recognizes, none of the classi
cal writers on laissez faire insisted that regulation of monopoly in
dustries was inappropriate: the only disputes were over its proper
form.43 But it was the progressives who tolerated the regulation of
competitive industries, and for that mistake we all pay the price
today given their complete victory in Nebbia v. New York, 44 which
placed the kibosh on the "affected with the public interest" list by
allowing the state to set minimum prices for milk.
No matter how one tugs and hauls, it is not possible to fit dairy
farming into one of the traditional categories of activities affected
by the public interest. The problem perceived by the farmers was
that of excessive competition, for which some exit from the market
was the sensible solution. But in Nebbia we have a system that
specifies minimum prices for the sale of milk, which hardly counts
as protection for consumers. At this point, the jig is really up. Only
Robert Hale's formless definitions of coercion could lead you to
prop up a cartel by the use of state power. But any more sober
assessment of the situation suggests that social welfare is benefited
by the "coercion" of a competitive industry and not by the "coer
cion" - i.e., old-fashioned state power - that is needed to keep
the dairy cartel in line. In the end, Hale's eagerness to discredit
42. See Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE LJ. 1089 (1930).
43. As Fried rightly notes, the classical restrictive position had three parts: businesses
carried out under public grants of exclusive privilege or franchise; those historical businesses
such as innkeepers and co=on carriers and gristmills regulated as such; and last, and most
amorphous, businesses in which "the owner by devoting his business to the public use, in
effect grants the public an interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the
extent of that interest although the property continues to belong to its private owner and to
be entitled to protection accordingly." P. 167. The list itself was compiled by Chief Justice
Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923), decided
the same year as Hale's famous review of Carver's Principles. See Hale, supra note 2.
Clearly Taft did not regard his third class as all-embracing for he struck down the labor
relations scheme presented to him in Wolff.
44. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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traditional conceptions of laissez faire justifies allowing the legisla
ture to protect cartels in what would be, without government inter
vention, competitive industries. The incautious use of terms like
coercion can lead to adverse social consequences.
The second half of Hale's project on the public regulation of
utilities addressed the proper form of regulation for those firms af
fected with the public interest. On this score, Hale placed in his
crosshairs the bellwether decision in Smyth v. Ames, 45 which intro
duced the "fair value" limitation into American constitutional law.
The motivation for Smyth is, at one level, easy enough to under
stand. The firms in question all held monopoly positions in their
industry. The case for some form of rate regulation was, and is, to
prevent the firm from extracting monopoly profits from its endeav
ors. Let that goal be achieved, and allocative efficiency is advanced
because people will no longer be induced to invest in areas where
the private returns are higher than the social ones. But firms must
make their investments before they receive any customer revenues,
so once rate regulation is allowed, the concern is whether the state
regulators will permit the firm to recover the cost of its capital and
make a reasonable - read competitive - profit on its investment.
State regulators could easily decide to reduce the rates to the point
where the revenues are higher than the variable costs of running
the business, but lower than the total costs of so doing. If they are
allowed to get away with that approach, then they have effectively
confiscated the capital of the regulated firms. And if they do it
often enough - perhaps even once - then no firms will supply the
services in spite of their manifest demand.
At one level, Hale did not take issue with this basic primer on
regulation. He did not think that Smyth was wrong because it of
fered invested capital some protection from rate regulation.
Rather, he thought that Smyth's formulation was the wrong way to
go. In Hale's view, use of the "fair value" limitation created a vi
cious circle (pp. 176-77). No one could figure out the value of the
firm until the regulation was put in place, for only then could its
potential revenues, on which firm valuation depended, be calcu
lated. Hale was correct to note the difficult problems of valuation
that this formula entailed, given that the firm, as an ongoing busi
ness, could not normally be sold in competitive markets. Deciding
therefore which assets were still gainfully employed in the business,
and which were not, was to his mind a pointless exercise.
Matters were only worse when regulators sought to evade this
restriction by claiming that prices should be set to equal "what serv
ices were worth in the market" (p. 178). Given that different indi
viduals have different subjective values, any system of rates will
45. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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meet this standard for the customers that continue to use the ser
vice in question. High rates are worth it to the few customers that
remain. Low rates are worth it to the many new customers that
flock to the firm
.

To that argument, Hale added another. It was quite pointless
for the Court in Smyth "to believe that there existed some 'fair' rate
of return on that value that would simultaneously allow the state
(pursuant to its police power) to reduce the net earnings of public
utilities, while (consistent with eminent domain principles) leaving
the value of the utilities' property intact" (pp. 180-81). The solu
tion? Switch the formula of rate regulation to one that essentially
ties rate of return calculations to the original cost of investment.
This formula was championed by Justice Brandeis in his concurring
opinion in Southwestern Bell v. Public Service Commission, 46 which
opted for a measure of value that guaranteed the firm an appropri
ate return on the amount of capital that it invested in the business,
without asking about its fair value at any given time, and without
trying to determine which fraction of it remains in service at any
given time. That view continued to gain adherents until its adop
tion was secured in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas, 47 which junked the "fair value" rule in favor of one that guar
anteed the firm a bottom-line return on its "actual legitimate
cost,"48 sometimes rephrased as "actual prudent cost" (pp. 187,
197). The intention in Hope was to get the regulators out of the
business of wading through each of the explicit assumptions incor
porated in the fair value determination. A sufficient bottom-line
return turned aside the constitutional challenge no matter how
many mistakes were made along the way. But - a point of no
small consequence - if the rates paid did not grant sufficient re
turn, then a constitutional violation could be found.
Now that passions on this issue have subsided somewhat, how
should we look at this debate today? There is no doubt that the
choice of standards will have real consequences in individual cases.
Yet, as the progressives understood, it was frequently unclear which
side to a rate hearing benefited from the Hope rule. When market
values are in decline, a public utility will embrace original cost as its
standard. When the market values rise, the regulator becomes par
tial to initial cost (pp. 193-94). These malleable forensic positions
of the parties tip us off as to the intellectual weakness in Hale's
case. That weakness does not lie in his critique of Smyth: no one
can deny the cost, uncertainty, and inconvenience of fair value de46. 262 U.S. 276, 289 {1923).
47. 320 U.S. 591 {1944).
48. See Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 596, 600.
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terminations.49 Rather, it lies in overstating the advantages of the
Hope rule.
Start with Hale's knockout blows. Is the fair valuation rule cir
cular? Well, it depends on what the rates in question are. No doubt
if they are set high enough to allow the firm to remain in business,
the value of the firm depends on the rates set; so to that extent, we
reason in a circle. But suppose that we just reduce the rates by
twenty percent across the board, as was the case in Smyth itself.50
Clearly at some point, the rates have to be adjudged too low, and
once we reach that point, the fair valuation requirement shows a
modicum of good sense. Or stated otherwise, the point of the sys
tem is not to make sure that customers pay what services are worth,
or that the firm gets a full return on its investment. Rather the task
becomes the intelligible one of working our way between Scylla and
Charybdis.51 Keep the rates high enough to avoid the confiscation;
keep them low enough to avoid monopoly extraction; and keep the
proceedings cheap enough so that all the gains from regulation are
not dissipated by administrative costs.
Perhaps Smyth did not get the balance quite right. But Hope is
neither toothless nor perfect. Clearly, Hope prescribes, as a mini
mum, rates that allow the regulated utility to cover its amortization
payments. It is not as though the regulator gets a free pass on rate
determination. Nor is the rule without difficulties of its own. Once
the regulator is required to allow rates that allow the regulated firm
to cover its original cost, the firm has an incentive to borrow capital,
and perhaps to leverage its investment in ways that encourage firm
instability. The rule could also make firms less careful to make pru
dent investments that are really prudent: Why should they care (as
much) if they can recover full returns on an investment that doesn't
quite make sense? Sometimes one has to see the return from a
given investment to decide whether it was prudent, at which point
the gap between Smyth and Hope starts to close. And so too the
balance of advantage. The choice here is not only of near
deductive necessity, but of second-best calculations. As Fried duti
fully notes (p. 197), the Hope rule of actual prudent costs looks a lot
simpler before it bears the scars of battle than it does afterwards.
The moment the rule becomes law, regulators may have to make
adjustments once the revenues received depart, either up or down,
from their anticipated level. Do we use these surpluses or deficits
to decrease or increase the original cost basis, and if so, by what
amount (p. 197)? Ultimately, it's a close call between the pure
49. Pp. 190, 191 (giving some of the costs).
50. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 542, for the rollback amount of 29%, which could dampen
one's day.
51. An image used by Holmes, and picked up by Fried. P. 185.
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forms of Smyth and Hope. But, in practice, elements of the one
bleed into the other. The entire issue is one on which reasonable
people can disagree - even those of us who think that some consti
tutional protection must be supplied to investors in regulated indus
tries. The Supreme Court has not returned to this issue very often,
but its decision in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch52 shows a keen
awareness of some of the difficulties in choosing standards in this
area. And nothing prevents the government from deciding to de
fend itself using the fair value standard of Smyth when it thinks that
this standard works to its advantage, as it has done in the looming
battle over the takings issue raised by the 1996 Telecommunications
Act.53 So here again we have serious difficulties which await seri
ous answers. But nothing from Hale's grand critique helps solve
the real problems that are, and will remain, on the table.
CONCLUSION
Hale's mission, then, counts as a large intellectual failure. But
what of Fried's? Here she is manifestly successful in the task of
exposition and summarization. She is successful in the realm of
criticism as well, for her Introduction and Conclusion contain a fair
and balanced appraisal of Hale's work. But what is lacking is her
willingness to abandon the ship that she helps to sink. Fried devas
tates Hale on particular points, only to praise lavishly the lasting
nature of his contribution. Her parting remark is that "Hale's criti
cal work endures as among the best examples of the Realist and
institutionalist tradition, casting the nature of legal rights and pri
vate economic relations in a new and significantly different light"
(p. 214).
In order to make good on that claim, she has to show how his
insights organized the solution for problems of the next generation.
Unfortunately, she does not show how Hale's insights advance the
ball by offering new insight into union power or rate regulation.
Quite the opposite, her concrete demonstrations show the danger
of Hale's approach. Thus she papers over the dangerous implica
tions of Hale's skepticism for issues of freedom of speech. After all,
what is left to the First Amendment if liberty is an empty idea? It is
one thing to suggest of Hale, as does Fried, that "[h]ad he been
forced to address the question of expressive freedoms directly in his
scholarly writing, he undoubtedly would have sided with Brandeis
and Chafee" (p. 208). But it is quite another thing to square these
sound sentiments with his skeptical position, or even to explain why
52. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
53. See Implementatin of the Local Competitive Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Frrst Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 1 869-72 (1996) (explicitly endorsing
Hope but arguing for a "fair market value" standard reminiscent of Smyth).

May 1999]

Laissez Faire

1721

he remained silent on the questions on which his contemporaries
had delivered such forceful statements. Similarly, Fried recognizes
that Hale's intellectual approach makes hash of the Takings Clause,
which presupposes that all property does not stem from the com
mand of the state, against whose actions the Constitution seeks to
protect it (p. 209). Further, she recognizes that his expansive claim
that all action is state action renders unintelligible the Equal Pro
tection and Due Process Clauses by making private action a virtual
impossibility (p. 209-10). And most astonishingly, in the end she
rejects the centerpiece of Hale's theory, namely, his view on coer
cion: "There remains a difference, after all, between pointing a gun
at another's head and demanding 'Your money or your life,' and
threatening to withhold bread from a starving person unless she
consents to pay the market price" (pp. 211-12). Precisely so. It is
instructive to identify the implicit baselines that undergird that dis
tinction, and the reasons why we accept them, which draws us back
to the distinction between negative and positive sum games devel
oped above. But Fried does not even attempt the reconstruction
that saves her champion from her own criticism. And so the bot
tom line is this: Hale's great strength was as a provocateur, as
someone who forced his intellectual opponents to reexamine the
foundations of laissez faire. His great weakness, for which we
should all be thankful, is that he failed to lay ruin to the intellectual
foundation of the system he sought to destroy. It is that message,
and none other, that Fried should have delivered to her readers.

